Abstract. One di culty in the cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard AES is the tension between operations in the two elds GF (2 8 ) and GF (2). This paper outlines a new approach that avoids this con ict. We de ne a new block cipher, the BES, that uses only simple algebraic operations in GF (2 8 ). Yet the AES can be regarded as being identical to the BES with a restricted message space and key space, thus enabling the AES to be realised solely using simple algebraic operations in one eld GF (2 8 ). This permits the exploration of the AES within a broad and rich setting. One consequence is that AES encryption can be described by an extremely sparse overdetermined multivariate quadratic system over GF (2 8 ), whose solution would recover an AES key.
1 Introduction Rijndael 7, 8] was chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and published as FIPS 197 21] on 26 November 2001. The AES is carefully designed to resist standard block cipher attacks 1, 18] . Here we move our attention to a cipher that is an extension of AES, but which o ers one particular advantage. All of the operations in this new cipher, the BES, are entirely described using very simple operations in GF (2 8 ). Thus while the AES is embedded within the BES, and while the BES fully respects encryption with the AES, there are no GF(2) 8 operations. The properties of this new cipher are intimately related to the properties of the AES, as the AES is essentially the BES with a restricted message and key space. The AES is, in essence, woven into the fabric of the BES. Yet, in many ways, the new cipher is easier to analyse. It is certainly easier to describe; one round of the cipher consists exclusively of inversion in GF (2 8 ), matrix multiplication in GF (2 8 ), and key addition in GF (2 8 ). By recasting the AES in this way we highlight some important structural features of the AES. We illustrate this with a di erential-type e ect in the BES that seems surprising given the design principles of the AES. Furthermore, we show that the AES preserves algebraic curves and that it can be expressed as a very simple system of multivariate quadratic equations over GF (2 8 ). It is entirely possible that such a new approach might o er signi cant improvements to the cryptanalysis of the AES.
Previous Work and Notation
Throughout the AES process, Rijndael (the eventual AES) received considerable cryptanalytic attention 10, 12, 17] . The simplicity of Rijndael was emphasized by its designers 7, 8] , and much work has concentrated on the structural properties of the cipher 9, 11, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24] .
In this paper we introduce a new technique which further simpli es analysis of the AES. While the AES encryption process is typically described using operations on an array of bytes, we represent the data as column vectors, so matrix multiplication of such a column vector occurs on the left. We regard a byte as an element of the binary eld de ned by the irreducible \Rijndael" polynomial Each byte therefore represents a polynomial in and we adopt the convention that the most signi cant bit in a byte (the 7 term) is represented by the leftmost, and most signi cant, bit of the hexadecimal representation of a byte.
The version of the AES we consider has a 128-bit or 16-byte message and key space, though our comments are more generally applicable. The new cipher BES has a 128-byte message and key space. We 3 The Basic Structure of the AES We refer to FIPS 197 21] for a full description of the cipher, but we list the signi cant steps here. We concentrate our attentions on a typical round; the rst and last rounds have a di erent (but related) form that is easily assimilated. We consider the basic version of the AES, which encrypts a 16-byte block using a 16-byte key with 10 encryption rounds. The input to the AES round function can be viewed as a rectangular array of bytes or, equivalently, as a column vector of bytes. Throughout the encryption process this byte-structure is fully respected. The AES speci cation de nes a round in terms of the following three transformations. (c) The output of the AES S-Box is (L A x) + 63, where addition is with respect to GF(2).
2. The AES linear di usion (mixing) layer.
(a) Each row of the array is rotated by a certain number of byte positions.
(b) Each column of the array is considered to be an F-vector, and a column y is transformed to the column C y, where C is a (4 4) F-matrix. 3 . The AES subkey addition. Each byte of the array is added (with respect to GF(2)) to a byte from the corresponding array of round subkeys.
The additive constant (63) in the AES S-box can be removed by incorporating it within a (slightly) modi ed key schedule 19] . For simplicity, we use this description of the AES in this paper.
The Big Encryption System (BES)
We introduce a new iterated block cipher, the Big Encryption System (BES), which operates on 128-byte blocks with a 16-byte key. Both the AES and the BES are de ned in terms of bytes and we now describe the common mathematical framework for both ciphers.
Both the AES and the BES use a state vector of bytes, which is transformed by the basic operations within a round. In both cases, the plaintext is the input state vector while the ciphertext is the output state vector. As described in Section 2, the state spaces of the AES and the BES are the vector spaces A = F 16 and B = F 128 respectively. We now describe the basic techniques required to establish the relationship between the AES and the BES.
Inversion. The inversion operation is easily described. For a 2 F, it is identical to standard eld inversion for non-zero eld elements with 0 (?1) = 0. For an n-dimensional vector a = (a 0 ; : : : ; a n?1 ) 2 . The n-dimensional vector a = (a 0 ; : : : ; a n?1 ) 2 F n is mapped to e a = (a) = ( (a 0 ); : : : ; (a n?1 )) :
The vector conjugate mapping has desirable algebraic properties, namely that it is additive and preserves inverses, so (2) In the following sections we describe the cipher BES. This is done in such a way that the \commuting" diagram in Figure 1 It should be obvious how we intend to use the embedding mapping . We set (a ij ) = (b ij0 ; : : : ; b ij7 ):
Each basic operation in a round of the AES describes a bijective mapping on A. These can be readily replaced with similar operations in the BES. Our aim in doing this is to ensure that every operation (including the GF(2)-linear map from the AES S-box) is expressed using simple algebraic operations over F.
Subkey addition. This is obvious for both the AES and the BES. Column operation. The AES MixColumn operation is de ned using a ( 4 4 The S-box GF (2)-linear operation. In the AES speci cation, f is de ned by considering F = GF (2 8 ) as the vector space GF (2) 8 . The transformation f is then represented by the action of an (8 8) GF (2) 1 C C C C C C C C C C C C A
We can now represent the entire set of GF (2) The key schedule in the AES uses the same operations as the AES encryption process, namely the GF(2)-linear map, componentwise inversion, byte rotation, and addition. Thus the key schedule can also be described using the same simple algebraic operations over F. Whenever a constant is required in the AES, we use the embedded image of that constant in the BES. Whenever a byte in the AES has to be moved to a di erent position, we ensure that the corresponding vector conjugate is moved as a single entity in the BES. In this way, we ensure that if a BES key the conjugacy property, then so do all its derived subkeys. 
The relationship between the AES and the BES
The BES is a 128-byte block cipher, which consists entirely of simple algebraic operations over F. It has the property that B A , the set of embedded images of AES vectors, or equivalently the set of all BES inputs with the conjugacy property, is closed under the action of the BES round function. Furthermore, encryption in the BES fully respects encryption in the AES and the commuting diagram given in Figure 1 holds. Thus the BES restricted to B A provides an alternative description of the AES and analysis of the BES may well provide additional insight into the AES.
Algebraic Observations on the BES
The round function of the BES, and hence essentially the AES, is given by
Thus a round of the AES is simply componentwise inversion and an a ne transformation with respect to the same eld F = GF (2 8 ). This suggests many possible areas for future investigation. We o er some preliminary observations. These observations may seem somewhat abstract, but they do have important consequences. We discuss an example below in which these observations can be used to illustrate certain di erential properties of the BES.
Linear di usion in BES

Related encryptions in the BES.
As noted in Section 5. for which e T = e T M B , so e T b = e T (M B b). We now describe some interesting properties relating two plaintext-ciphertext pairs generated under related subkey sequences. These properties hold with probability one and so they can be appropriately extended to any number of rounds. Suppose we encrypt the two pairs of plaintexts under two sets of related subkey sequences as detailed in the above table, then the plaintext and ciphertext di erence parities have the same relationship, as shown in the above table. This relationship holds with probability one, so would be applicable for any number of rounds. Thus there exists a probability one di erential e ect under related subkey sequences in the BES in which every S-Box is active.
Relevance of these BES observations to the AES. These preliminary observations do not apply when speci c details of the key schedule are considered. Even if they did, they would not apply directly to the AES for a rather subtle reason. If (p; tp) 2 B B, then (p; tp) = 2 B A B A ; that is if p has the conjugacy property, then tp cannot have the conjugacy property (t 6 = 0; 1). Thus, if p is an embedded AES plaintext, then tp cannot be an embedded AES plaintext.
However, these observations are very interesting for the light they shed on the AES design philosophy 7, 8]. As far as linear and di erential cryptanalysis are concerned, the BES would be expected to have similar properties to the AES. In particular, the di usion in both has the same reliance on MDS matrices. However in the BES, which is intricately entwined with the AES, we have exhibited a di erential-like property that occurs with certainty even though every S-Box is active.
Preservation of algebraic curves
Each of the BES operations, namely \inversions" (ignoring 0-inversion for the moment) and a ne transformations over F, are simple algebraic transformations of B. Thus each BES operation maps an algebraic curve de ned on B = F 128 to an isomorphic algebraic curve. For a given key 128-bit key k, more than half (about 53%) of AES plaintexts are encrypted without \inverting" 0 (since 160 inversions are performed). Let A k A denote this set of AES plaintexts for key k. If embedded plaintexts from A k lie on a curve, then the corresponding embedded ciphertexts lie on an isomorphic curve over F. Thus, the AES and the BES can be considered to preserve algebraically simple curves over F with a reasonable probability. In particular, the inversion and the a ne transformation of the BES round function map quadratic forms over F to quadratic forms over F, so the AES can be described using a very simple system of multivariate quadratic equations over F. We consider the consequences of this observation below.
Multivariate Quadratic Equations
We now demonstrate that recovering an AES key is equivalent to solving particular systems of extremely sparse multivariate quadratic equations by expressing a BES (and hence an AES) encryption as such a system. The problem of solving such systems of equations lies at the heart of several public key cryptosystems 3, 22] , and there has been some progress in providing solutions to such problems 4, 5, 14] . Recently, Courtois and Pieprzyk 6] have suggested the use of a system of multivariate quadratic equations over GF (2) to analyse the AES. However, such a GF(2)-system derived directly from the AES is far more complicated than the F-system derived from the BES.
6.1 A simple multivariate quadratic system for the AES We rst establish the notation that we need. We denote the plaintext and ci- We assume that 0-inversion does not occur as part of the encryption or the key schedule. This assumption is true for 53% of encryptions and 85% of 128-bit keys, and even if the assumption is invalid, only a very few of the following equations are incorrect. Under the stated assumption, the system of equations can be written as: We thus obtain a collection of simultaneous multivariate quadratic equations which fully describe a BES encryption. These are given for j = 0; : : : ; 15 A BES encryption can therefore be described as a multivariate quadratic system using 2688 equations over F, of which 1280 are (extremely sparse) quadratic equations and 1408 are linear (di usion) equations. These equations comprise 5248 terms, made from 2560 state variables and 1408 key variables.
When we consider an AES encryption embedded in the BES framework, we obtain more multivariate quadratic equations because the embedded state variables of an AES encryption are in B A and possess the conjugacy property.
We thus obtain the following very simple multivariate quadratic equations for j = 0; : : : ; 15 An AES encryption can therefore be described as an overdetermined multivariate quadratic system using 5248 equations over F, of which 3840 are (extremely sparse) quadratic equations and 1408 are linear equations. These encryption equations comprise 7808 terms, made from 2560 state variables and 1408 key variables. Furthermore, the AES key schedule can be expressed as a similar multivariate quadratic system. In its most sparse form, the key schedule system uses 2560 equations over F, of which 960 are (extremely sparse) quadratic equations and 1600 are linear equations. These key schedule equations comprise 2368 terms made from the 2048 variables, of which 1408 are basic key variables and 640 are auxiliary variables. We can, of course, immediately reduce the sizes of these multivariate quadratic systems by using the linear equations to substitute for state and key variables, though the resulting system is slightly less sparse. { Regard the generated system of equations of higher degree as linear combinations of formal terms.
Potential attack techniques
{ If there are more linearly independent equations than terms, solve the linear system. The recently proposed extended sparse linearisation or XSL algorithm 6] is a modi cation of the XL algorithm that attempts to solve the types of multivariate quadratic systems that can occur in iterated block ciphers. A discussion of the use of the XSL algorithm on the AES multivariate quadratic GF(2)-system is given in 6]. The AES F-system derived from the BES is far simpler, which would suggest that the XSL algorithm would solve this F-system far faster (2 100 AES encryptions) than the GF(2)-system. However, the estimate given for the number of linearly independent equations generated by the XSL technique 6] appears to be inaccurate 2].
It is obvious that much urgent research is required on the solution of AES multivariate quadratic systems over F to see what new cryptanalytic approaches and attacks are possible. In particular, re nements to XL-type techniques and the applicability of sparse matrix techniques seem to be important topics for future work. It is certainly important to know the degree and size of linearly soluble systems generated from the AES multivariate quadratic systems. If the degree and size of such a generated system is too small, then attacks on the AES might be possible. We note that the BES representation of the AES gives other simple quadratic equations over F, such as x i;(j;m+1) w i;(j;m) = x i;(j;m) or x i;(j;m+2) w i;(j;m) = x i;(j;m+1) x i;(j;m) . These can be used to build other simple multivariate quadratic systems over F for the AES. Indeed, the rst of these equations is essentially used to construct the GF(2) system for the AES given in 6]. We can also use simple higher degree equations over F to build other simple multivariate systems for the AES. It is clear from this brief discussion that many aspects of the AES representation over F remain to be investigated.
Implications for the AES
The cryptanalysis of the AES is equivalent to the solution of some particular system of extremely sparse multivariate quadratic equations over F. The analysis of the AES as a complicated multivariate quadratic system over GF (2) by Courtois and Pieprzyk 6] is related to the problem of nding such a solution. Most of the other published security results on the AES are concerned with demonstrating that bit-level linear and di erential techniques do not compromise the AES.
However, from an algebraic viewpoint, such techniques are trace (F ! GF (2)) function techniques, and trace function techniques are not normally employed in the solution of multivariate systems. It is arguable that an important aspect of the security of the AES, namely the solubility of an extremely sparse multivariate quadratic system over F, is yet to be explored.
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a novel interpretation of the AES as being embedded in a new cipher, the BES. However, the BES does not necessarily inherit security properties we might have expected from the AES. Furthermore, the BES has a simple algebraic round function consisting solely of a componentwise inversion and and a highly structured a ne transformation over the same eld GF (2 8 ). Indeed, this alternative description of the AES is mathematically much simpler than the original speci cation. One consequence is that the security of the AES is equivalent to the solubility of certain extremely sparse multivariate quadratic systems over GF (2 8 ).
